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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-TIRD CIRCUIT RULING MAY FORECLOSE
IMPOSITION OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY ON SUMMARY
JUDGMENT UNDER CERCLA
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (1992)
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1970s, as the general public became aware of the in-
creasing numbers of hazardous waste sites throughout the United
States, concern spread over the grave health and environmental threats
posed by these sites.' In response to these problems, Congress passed
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA) in 1980.2 Congress enacted CERCLA primarily to
1. See Scot C. Stirling, Reasonable Expectations of Insurance Coverage and the
Problem of Environmental Liabilities, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 395, 395 n.5 (1990) (noting
that estimated costs for clean-up of approximately 1,200 to 2,000 hazardous
waste sites throughout United States in 1979 was between $26.2 billion and
$44.1 billion); William W. Balcke, Note, Superfund Settlements: The Failed Promise of
the 1986 Amendments, 74 VA. L. REV. 123, 124 (1988) (noting that estimated
number of hazardous waste sites in United States ranges from 1,500 to 10,000
and that estimated clean up costs range between $10 billion and $100 billion).
Three environmental disasters in the late 1970s focused the American pub-
lic's attention on the potential dangers of hazardous waste disposal. Molly A.
Meegan, Note, Municipal Liability for Household Hazardous Waste: An Analysis of the
Superfund Statute and Its Policy Implications, 79 GEO. L.J. 1783, 1784 n.13 (1991).
The first of these incidents, the Love Canal incident, involved the building of a
residential neighborhood over a site in which chemical wastes had been dumped
and where sludge, fly ash and municipal wastes had been processed. Id. In the
late 1970s extremely dangerous levels of hazardous chemicals were detected in
the homes. Id. Area residents suffered abnormal rates of birth defects, miscar-
riages, epilepsy and liver problems. Id. In the second incident, the Valley of the
Drums incident, environmental officials discovered 20,000 barrels of toxic chem-
icals abandoned in a field in Kentucky. 126 CONG. REC. 30,931 (1980) (state-
ment of Sen. Randolph). Finally, in the Kepone incident, a chemical plant in
Virginia dumped wastes into the James River and destroyed a $2 million per
year seafood harvest. Meegan, Note, supra, at 1784-85 n.13.
2. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988)); see Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the
Cases Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, 45 Bus. LAw. 923, 925 (1990) ("Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to
provide a comprehensive response to the problem of hazardous substance re-
lease." (quoting Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 890 (9th
Cir. 1986))); Balcke, Note, supra note 1, at 123 (noting that Congress enacted
CERCLA to provide statutory framework for responding to risks from uncon-
trolled hazardous waste sites);James P. Teufel, Note, Arranging For or Disposing of
Liability Under CERCLA: Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 40
DEPAUL L. REV. 577, 577 (1991) (noting that CERCLA was "enacted to address
ongoing problems resulting from hazardous substance contamination" (citing
SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, ENVIRONMENT EMERGENCY
RESPONSE ACT, S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-10 (1980) and HousE
(1241)
1
Aikens: Environmental Law - Third Circuit Ruling May Foreclose Imposition
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993
1242 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38: p. 1241
ensure that these contaminated sites would be made safe and that par-
ties responsible for the environmental harm would bear the costs of
remedying that harm.3 Under CERCLA, courts have traditionally im-
posed joint and several liability on responsible parties where wastes
have commingled, allowing a defendant to escape joint and several lia-
bility only where the defendant could prove that the environmental
harm attributable to its wastes was divisible from that attributable to
other defendants. 4 . Prior to United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan),5
courts had uniformly held that defendants had not proven divisibility
and were thus jointly and severally liable at multi-generator sites con-
taining commingled wastes. 6
COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTAINMENT
ACT OF 1980, H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1, at 18-22 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-20)). CERCLA was substantially
amended in 1986 by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)). For a discussion of SARA, see infra notes 13
and 31 and accompanying text.
3. See 126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph) (noting
that purposes of CERCLA are to expedite clean-up and to assure that those re-
sponsible for chemical harms bear costs of clean-up); see also Colloquy, Develop-
ments in the Law - Toxic Waste Litigation: Liability Issues in CERCLA Cleanup Actions,
99 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1514 n.7 (1986) (noting that objectives of CERCLA are
to ensure that those responsible for environmental harm bear costs of remedia-
tion and to assure that costs of unsafe disposal are internalized by industry) (cit-
ing S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-15, 31-34 (1980)).
4. See, e.g., Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439, 1447-48
(W.D. Mich. 1989) (noting that liability under CERCLA is joint and several ex-
cept where defendants can demonstrate that harm is divisible); United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 63 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (noting that
burden is on defendants under CERCLA to prove divisibility of harm where two
or more defendants have combined to cause environmental harm); United States
v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (noting that
courts have traditionally imposed joint and several liability under CERCLA un-
less defendants could prove divisibility of harm).
Although courts have traditionally imposed joint and several liability, CER-
CLA does not mandate such a result. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum
Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268 (3d Cir.) (noting that CERCLA contains no express
provisions for joint and several liability in cases involving multiple defendants),
reh'g denied, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 17371 (July 27, 1992). The Third Circuit noted,
however, that Congress intended for courts to use federal common-law princi-
ples to determine whether joint and several liability is appropriate on a case-by-
case basis. Id. Courts have traditionally looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(Restatement) for guidance on joint and several liability. E.g., United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106
(1989); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio
1983). The Restatement provides that "[elach of two or more persons whose tor-
tious conduct is a legal cause of a single and indivisible harm to the injured party
is subject to liability to the injured party for the entire harm." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1977).
5. 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir.), reh'g denied, 1992 U.S. LEXIS App. 17371 (July
27, 1992).
6. See, e.g., United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir.
1989) (holding defendants jointly and severally liable on summary judgment be-
2
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In Alcan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that in cases involving multi-generator hazardous waste sites con-
taining commingled wastes, a court must conduct extensive fact finding
and must grant each defendant an opportunity to demonstrate divisibil-
ity of harm before imposing joint and several liability. 7 The Third Cir-
cuit stated that the district court failed to afford Alcan such an
opportunity by granting summary judgment to the government. 8 Thus,
the Third Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment for the government and remanded the case to allow Alcan Alumi-
num Corporation (Alcan) an opportunity to demonstrate that the
damages it caused were divisible from those caused by other generators
at the site.9
The Third Circuit's decision in Alcan marked the first time that a
United States circuit court of appeals reversed a district court's holding
that defendants were jointly and severally liable at a site containing com-
mingled wastes. 10 At the very least, this decision interjects uncertainty
cause wastes had commingled and defendants had not presented sufficient evi-
dence of divisibility), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883
F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding defendants jointly and severally liable
because defendants had not proven divisibility of harm), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1071 (1990); Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171 n.22, 172 (holding defendants jointly
and severally liable on summary judgment because they had not presented any
evidence of divisibility). The views of these courts are consistent with the Re-
statement, which provides that:
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more
causes where
(a) there are distinct harms, or(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of
each cause to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or
more causes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1977). The Restatement also provides
that "[i]f two or more persons, acting independently, tortiously cause distinct
harms or a single harm for which there is a reasonable basis for division accord-
ing to the contribution of each, each is subject to liability only for the portion of
the total harm that he has himself caused." Id. § 881. For a discussion of R. W.
Meyer, O'Neil and Monsanto, see infra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
7. Alcan, 964 F.2d at 269. For a complete discussion of the Third Circuit's
reasoning in Alcan, see infra notes 73-107 and accompanying text.
8. See Alcan, 964 F.2d at 269 (noting that divisibility issue is intensely factual
in nature).
9. Id. at 270.
10. Compare Alcan, 964 F.2d at 269 (noting that district court erred in grant-
ing summary judgment for government because of "intensely factual nature of
the divisibility issue") with R. W. Meyer, 889 F.2d at 1506-07 (affirming district
court's grant of summary judgment holding defendants jointly and severally lia-
ble because district court's finding that harm was indivisible was not clearly erro-
neous) and O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 182 (affirming district court's holding that
defendant was jointly and severally liable because defendant could not demon-
strate divisibility of harm due to commingling of wastes) and Monsanto, 858 F.2d
at 171 (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment holding defendants
jointly and severally liable because harm appeared indivisible due to commin-
19931 1243
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into the scope of liability under CERCLA and may significantly weaken
the EPA's bargaining power in CERCLA cases.I At the most, this deci-
sion may result in the demise of joint and several liability under
CERCLA. 12
II. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Background
CERCLA, as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) 13 , was enacted to establish a com-
prehensive statute for controlling the many serious problems associated
with abandoned hazardous waste sites.14 CERCLA authorizes the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) to commence "removal and other
remedial actions" to abate any actual or threatened releases of hazard-
ous substances posing a potential threat to the public health or the envi-
ronment.' 5 Upon determining that a hazardous waste site may pose a
gling of wastes and defendants failed to prove otherwise). For a further discus-
sion of these cases, see infra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
11. For further discussion of the possible implications of this decision, see
infra notes 108-29 and accompanying text.
12. See Third Circuit Ruling Said to Strike Blow at CERCLA'sJoint, Several Liabil-
ity Scheme, 7 Toxics L. REP. 17 (BNA), No. 1, at 17 (June 3, 1992) (noting that
Alcan may spell "the beginning of the end of joint and several liability under
superfund"). For further discussion of the possible implications of this decision,
see infra notes 108-29 and accompanying text.
13. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1615 (amending scattered sections of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)). SARA made several reforms to
CERCLA, addressing issues such as clean-up standards, federal-state relations,
litigation procedures and settlement guidelines. For a further discussion of
SARA, see infra note 31 and accompanying text.
14. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 22, reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125 (1980) (stating that CERCLA was enacted "to
initiate and establish a comprehensive response and financing mechanism to
abate and control the vast problems associated with abandoned and inactive haz-
ardous waste disposal sites").
15. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1988). CERCLA provides, in pertinent
part:
(1) Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a
substantial threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is
a release or substantial threat of release into the environment of any
pollutant or contaminant which may present an imminent and substan-
tial danger to the public health or welfare, the President is authorized
to act . . . to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for
remedial action relating to such hazardous substance, pollutant, or con-
taminant at any time ... or take any other response measure consistent
with the national contingency plan which the President deems neces-
sary to protect the public health or welfare or the environment.
Id. § 9604(a)(1).
The Executive Office delegated most of its authority under CERCLA to the
EPA. Exec. Order No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1982), amended by Exec. Order. No.
12,418, 3 C.F.R. 187, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1983). The Executive Office
also delegated its authority to the EPA under the Superfund Amendments
1244
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threat, the EPA may either: (1) require the potentially responsible par-
ties (PRPs) 16 to clean the site themselves and bear the costs' 7 or (2)
Reauthorization Act of 1986. Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923
(1987), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1988).
16. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). CERCLA broadly defines a "re-
sponsible party" as:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances owned or possessed
by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incinera-
tion vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance[.]
Id.
Responsible parties are liable for "all costs of removal or remedial action."
Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A). The potential liability of these "responsible parties" under
CERCLA is extremely broad and often results in millions of dollars being as-
sessed. See Barry S. Neuman, No Way Out? The Plight of the Superfund NonSettlor,
20 ENVrL. L. REP. 10,295, n.6 (July 1990) (noting that costs of Superfund clean-
ups average between $20-$30 million); Stirling, supra note 1, at 396 n.7 (noting
that costs of Superfund clean-ups average more than $10 million and could
reach as high as $30-$50 million under SARA).
In order to state a prima facie case against PRPs under § 9607(a), the gov-
ernment must establish that the defendants are (i) persons (ii) responsible for
(iii) the disposal of (iv) a hazardous substance (v) from a facility (vi) from which
there is a release or threatened release of the substance into the environment
(vii) because of which the claimant takes necessary response actions. Barr, supra
note 2, at 939-40. When the government cleans up a site, the money to fund the
clean-up comes from the Hazardous Substances Superfund (Superfund). 26
U.S.C. § 9507 (1988); see Teufel, Note, supra note 2, at 584 (noting that
Superfund was established to provide resources necessary to respond immedi-
ately to releases of hazardous substances). The Superfund contains $13 billion,
which the government uses to pay for its response costs incurred. CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. § 9611 (1988). Although the amount of money in the Superfund seems
infinite, given the costs associated with cleanup and the large number of
Superfund sites, it is crucial that the government be able to replenish the fund
by recouping its costs from the PRPs. See United States v. American Cyanamid
Co., 786 F. Supp. 152, 157 (D.R.I. 1992) (noting that there are presently 1,200
Superfund sites and about 100 are added each year); see also Colloquy, supra note
3, at 1516 (stating that promptly replenishing Superfund facilitates govern-
ment's efforts to clean hazardous waste sites as quickly as possible).
17. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). In order for the government to
institute this type of action, however, there must be an "imminent and substan-
tial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility." Id.
Section 9606 authorizes the government to seek an injunction in a United States
district court for the district in which the threat occurs or to issue administrative
orders against PRPs under § 9607. Id.
5
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clean the site itself, and recover its costs by instituting a cost recovery
suit after clean-up. 18
CERCLA was drafted hastily in the waning hours of the 96th Con-
gress.' 9 Although CERCLA has been criticized as being poorly drafted
and riddled with inconsistencies, 20 it has proven to be an effective tool
for the government in its effort to clean hazardous waste sites through-
out the country. 2 1 Federal courts have traditionally interpreted CER-
CLA broadly, construing the statute in favor of the government. 2 2 In
18. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). A primary goal of CERCLA,
however, is to induce PRPs to settle with the EPA, thereby expediting recovery
of clean-up costs. See Neuman, supra note 16, at 10295 (noting that CERCLA's
success depends on ability of government to reach settlements with private par-
ties and that central purpose of CERCLA is to encourage settlements); Anne D.
Weber, Note, Misery Loves Company: Spreading the Costs of CERCLA Cleanup, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1469, 1482 (1989) (noting that SARA encourages PRPs to settle:
(1) by allowing settling PRPs to avoid joint and several liability; (2) by allocating
response costs among PRPs; (3) by allowing for partial settlements; and (4) by
granting covenants not to sue). The strongest incentive to settle, however, lies
in the courts' imposition of strict, joint and several liability on summary judg-
ment under CERCLA. See, e.g., United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d
1497, 1507 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that liability under CERCLA is strict, joint
and several), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); United States v. Monsanto Co.,
858 F.2d 160, 167, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106
(1989). For further discussion of these cases, see infra notes 41-52 and accom-
panying text.
A party who settles will probably not be held accountable for a grossly dis-
proportionate share of costs. See Weber, supra, at 1484 (stating that SARA au-
thorizes EPA to allocate responsibility among settling generators based on
volume of wastes at site). If a party does not settle, however, a court may hold
that party jointly and severally liable for a disproportionate share of the costs.
See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp. 531 (N.D.N.Y. 1991)
(noting that government settled with 82 out of 83 defendants and holding non-
settling defendant liable for balance of response costs without regard to propor-
tionate share of fault), rev'd in part and remanded, 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993).
19. See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENvrL.
L. 1, 1 (1982) (noting that CERCLA was hurriedly enacted by lame-duck session
of 96th Congress); Teufel, Note, supra note 2, at 579 (stating that CERCLA was
compromise bill hastily promulgated during last days of Carter Administration).
20. See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91
(3d Cir. 1988) ("It is not surprising, that as a hastily conceived and briefly de-
bated piece of legislation, CERCLA failed to address many important issues
.... "), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989); see also Barr, supra note 2, at 923 (noting
that CERCLA has been criticized as sloppily drafted, hastily drawn up and lack-
ing in useful legislative history); Balcke, Note, supra note 1, at 124 (noting that
CERCLA has been imperfect environmental reform scheme and has been sub-
ject to extensive criticism).
21. See Barr, supra note 2, at 1000-01 (noting that although CERCLA's lia-
bility scheme may result in potentially unfairly harsh consequences, it has
proven to be viable answer to hazardous waste problems); Colloquy, supra note
3, at 1542 (noting that despite flaws, CERCLA can be reasonable response to
hazardous waste sites).
22. See Alcan, 964 F.2d at 258 (stating that because CERCLA is remedial
statute, courts must interpret CERCLA liberally to realize congressional goals);
6
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construing CERCLA in this manner, courts have imposed strict, joint
and several liability on generators at sites containing commingled wastes
once the government has proven a prima facie case.23 Moreover, many
courts have determined the scope of liability as a matter of law, granting
summary judgment in favor of the government. 24 As a result, hazardous
waste generators have often complained that CERCLA's statutory
framework, coupled with the courts' broad interpretations, results in
harsh and unfair results. Industry has argued that this approach not
only imposes liability without fault, but also may require a party who
contributed only a small percentage of the overall harm to pay the entire
costs of the clean-up. 2
5
see also Colloquy, supra note 3, at 1513 (noting that courts have interpreted CER-
CLA broadly in favor of government); Jeffery M. Gaba, Interpreting Section
107(a)(3) of CERCLA: When Has a Person "Arranged for Disposal?", 44 Sw. L.J.
1313, 1329 (1991) (noting that courts have traditionally imposed liability on
wide class of PRPs).
Congress intended courts to interpret CERCLA in accordance with "an
evolving federal common law." Barr, supra note 2, at 925. Thus, courts should
remain consistent in their broad interpretations of CERCLA because their inter-
pretations will be based on this federal common law. See id. at 925-26 (noting
that CERCLA encouraged development of federal common law to ensure
uniformity).
23. See, e.g., Alcan, 964 F.2d at 259, 267 (noting that liability under CERCLA
is strict, joint and several); United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497,
1507 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that CERCLA provides for strict liability and that
courts have construed CERCLA to allow for imposition ofjoint and several lia-
bility when harm is indivisible), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); United States
v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that
majority of courts have held that CERCLA imposes strict, joint and several lia-
bility); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167, 171 (4th Cir. 1988)
(noting that liability under CERCLA is strict and CERCLA permits imposition of
joint and several liability in cases of indivisible harm), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106
(1989). For a discussion of the elements the government must establish in order
to prove a prima facie case of liability, see supra note 16.
24. See R. W Meyer, 889 F.2d at 1507 (affirming district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment holding defendants jointly and severally liable because commin-
gling of wastes resulted in presumption of indivisible harm and defendants had
not rebutted presumption with any evidence of divisibility); Monsanto, 858 F.2d
at 171 (same). But see United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711,
722-23 (2d Cir. 1993) (Alcan Second Circuit), (reversing district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of government because Alcan's expert affidavits had
created genuine issues of material fact with respect to divisibility); Alcan, 964
F.2d at 269 (reversing district court's grant of summary judgment holding Alcan
jointly and severally liable and remanding to allow Alcan to present evidence of
divisibility).
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court to grant
summary judgment when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see
also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
25. See Barr, supra note 2, at 924 (noting that CERCLA has been described
as "the harshest liability scheme around" (quoting Ruth Simon, Deals That Smell
Bad, FORBES, May 15, 1989, at 49)); see also Weber, Note, supra note 18, at 1470
(noting that minor contributor of wastes with deep pocket can be held liable for
entire amount of clean-up, yielding unjust results).
7
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B. Caselaw
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp. 26 was the first of many cases to hold
that a court may impose joint and several liability under CERCLA when
commingling of wastes occurs. 2 7 In Chem-Dyne, the court determined
that by removing the mandatory joint and several liability provisions
from the final version of CERCLA, Congress did not intend to preclude
joint and several liability under CERCLA, but rather, intended CERCLA
liability to be based upon principles of common law. 28 In addressing
the issue of joint and several liability under CERCLA, the Chem-Dyne
court looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement), which states
that when two or more persons act independently to cause a single and
26. 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
27. Id. at 810. For a discussion of subsequent cases imposing joint and sev-
eral liability under CERCLA, see infra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
In Chem-Dyne, the government sued 24 defendants, alleging that the defend-
ants either generated or transported the hazardous wastes located at the Chem-
Dyne treatment facility. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 804. The defendants moved
for summary judgment, asking for a determination that they were not jointly and
severally liable for clean-up costs. Id. The defendants argued that Congress did
not intend to impose joint and several liability under CERCLA because Con-
gress had deleted a joint and several liability provision from the final bill. Id. at
805. The issue of whether CERCLA allowed for imposition ofjoint and several
liability was a matter of first impression for the Chem-Dyne court and at that time,
there was no case law specifically addressing this issue. Id. at 804. The Chem-
Dyne court noted that the typical CERCLA case involves numerous generators
and transporters who have disposed of hazardous wastes at a single site. Id. at
810.
For a discussion of cases subsequent to Chem-Dyne holding defendantsjointly and severally liable on summary judgment because defendants could not
create a genuine issue of material fact as to divisibility, see infra notes 41-52 and
accompanying text.
28. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 806. The Chem-Dyne court quoted from the
remarks of Senator Stafford, who was the sponsor of the bill proposing CER-
CLA. Id. Senator Stafford stated:
We have kept strict liability in the compromise, specifying the stan-
dard of liability under section 311 of the Clean Water Act, but we have
deleted any reference to joint and several liability, relying on common
law principles to determine when parties should be severally liable ....
The changes were made in recognition of the difficulty in prescribing in
statutory terms liability standards which will be applicable in individual
cases. The changes do not reflect a rejection of the standards in the
earlier bill.
Id. (quoting 126 CONG. REC. S14964 (Nov. 24, 1980)).
In reviewing CERCLA's legislative history, the Chem-Dyne court determined
that Congress omitted the joint and several liability provision from the final bill
in order to avoid a mandatory standard that would have unfair results in some
cases. Id. at 808. The Chem-Dyne court determined that the scope of liability was
to be determined under federal common-law principles on a case-by-case basis.
Id. at 807. Furthermore, the court noted that liability based on varying state
standards would undermine the purpose of CERCLA by encouraging dumping
in states with lenient laws. Id. at 809. Thus, the Chem-Dyne court concluded,
courts should assess the propriety ofjoint and several liability on a case-by-case
basis, based on uniform federal standards. Id. at 807-09.
8
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indivisible harm, each is subject to liability for the entire harm.2 9 Fol-
lowing the Restatement, the Chem-Dyne court determined that joint and
several liability was not precluded under CERCLA and held the defend-
ants jointly and severally liable.30
In 1986, Congress substantially amended CERCLA through the en-
actment of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 (SARA).3 ' Although Congress did not include a mandatory joint
29. Id. at 810 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1976) and
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 315-16 (4th ed. 1971)). The Chem-Dyne
court also noted, however, that under common law, when two or more persons
act independently and cause a single harm, if there is a reasonable basis for
division of liability according to the contribution of each tortfeasor, each is only
liable for that portion of the harm attributable to him or her. Id. (citing RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 443A, 881 (1976) and PROSSER, supra, at 313-
14). Under the Restatement formulation, the defendants have the burden to
prove divisibility. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (1976)).
The Chem-Dyne court stated that these rules are applicable in determining liabil-
ity under § 107 (a) of CERCLA. Id.
30. Id. The Chem-Dyne court denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment because the wastes at the site had commingled and the defendants had
not proven divisibility of harm. Id. Determining whether the defendants in this
case were jointly and severally liable necessitated a complex factual inquiry. Id.
The Chem-Dyne court noted that the appropriateness ofjoint and several liability
depended on whether or not the harm was divisible. Id. If a defendant proves
that the harm is divisible and that a reasonable basis for apportionment of dam-
ages exists, that individual defendant will not be jointly and severally liable. Id.
Rather, the defendant will only be liable for that portion of the harm that it
caused. Id. The court also noted that the volume of waste contributed by an'
individual generator may not be an accurate predictor of the harm caused by
that waste because of the toxicity and migratory potential of many wastes. Id.
The Chem-Dyne court determined that because the wastes had commingled, de-
fendants were not entitled to summary judgment. Id.
31. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1615 (amending scattered sections of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)). In enacting SARA, Congress added
several provisions to CERCLA that lessen defendants' potential liability under
the statute. For example, § 9613(0(2) provides that if a responsible party has
settled with the government, it will not be liable for contribution regarding mat-
ters addressed in the settlement. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (1988).
SARA also added a provision allowing defendants to sue other potentially
liable parties for contribution. Id. § 9613(0(1). This section provides, in perti-
nent part:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable
or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or follow-
ing any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section
9607(a) of this title .... In resolving contribution claims, the court
may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable
factors as the court determines are appropriate ....
Id. Thus, if a responsible party believes that it has paid more than its fair share
of the costs of clean-up, it may seek indemnity from other parties. Moreover,
courts may consider equitable factors in contribution proceedings, even though
courts may not consider equitable factors in a cost recovery action. Id.; see also
O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 725-26 (D.R.I. 1988) (noting that equitable
apportionment considerations are best determined at subsequent contribution
proceeding rather than at initial liability phase), affj'd, 883 F.2d 176 (lst Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990). At least one court has noted, however,
9
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and several liability provision in SARA, it approved of the Chem-Dyne
court's method of applying joint and several liability on a case-by-case
basis.3 2 Subsequent to the enactment of SARA, several United States
circuit courts of appeals have considered SARA's impact on the scope of
liability under CERCLA at multi-generator sites containing commingled
wastes.
33
In O'Neil v. Picillo,3 4 the state of Rhode Island and the EPA sought
to hold three companies jointly and severally liable under section 107 of
CERCLA for past and future clean-up costs of hazardous wastes at the
Picillo pig farm.3 5 In O'Neil, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit acknowledged that CERCLA's liability scheme, which
presumes indivisibility where wastes have commingled, could be unfair
to some defendants. 36 The First Circuit determined, however, that Con-
that § 9613(0(1) may not be comforting to defendants who cannot prove divisi-
bility, because it may be difficult for defendants to locate a sufficient number of
solvent parties from whom to seek contribution. O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176,
179 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990). Moreover, even if defend-
ants do locate a sufficient number of solvent parties, contribution suits may be
extremely costly. Id.
32. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 n.23 (4th Cir.
1988) (stating that "the approach taken in Chem-Dyne was subsequently con-
firmed as correct by Congress in its consideration of SARA's contribution pro-
ceedings"); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 79-80,
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2856 (stating that "nothing in this bill is
intended to change the application of the uniform federal rule ofjoint and sev-
eral liability enunciated by the Chem-Dyne court").
33. For a discussion of post-SARA cases addressing divisibility of harm at
multi-generator sites containing commingled wastes, see infra notes 34-52 and
accompanying text.
34. 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990).
35. Id. at 177. In 1977, the Picillos permitted their farm to be used as a
waste disposal site. Id. During that year, thousands of barrels of hazardous
waste were haphazardly deposited on the Picillo farm, which eventually caused
an explosion and resulted in a massive fire. Id. In 1979, after discovering
thousands of barrels leaking toxic substances, the EPA and the state commenced
a clean-up action. Id. The government attempted to recover the clean-up costs
that it already incurred and to hold the responsible parties liable for any future
clean-up costs. Id. at 178. The complaint named 35 companies, but 30 of the
companies settled with the state for approximately $6 million. Id. The state
instituted an action in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode
Island against the remaining five defendants. Id. The court found that two of
the five defendants were not liable because their wastes were not "hazardous" as
defined by CERCLA. Id. The court, however, found the remaining three de-
fendants jointly and severally liable for the past clean-up costs not covered by
settlement, as well as for all future clean-up costs. Id. Two of the three defend-
ants contended that their contribution of wastes at the site was minimal and they
should therefore not be held jointly and severally liable. Id.
36. Id. at 178. The First Circuit acknowledged in ONeil that responsible
parties will rarely escape joint and several liability under CERCLA when genera-
tors' wastes commingle at a site because it is virtually impossible to apportion
the relative harms. Id. at 178-79. Thus, the court noted, defendants will often
be forced to pay for more than their share of the harm. Id. at 179.
The First Circuit noted that Congress did include provisions in SARA, how-
10
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gress intended for those who were at least partially responsible for the
environmental harm to bear the costs of clean-up. 37 Accordingly, the
First Circuit held that SARA did not preclude the imposition ofjoint and
several liability under CERCLA.3 8 Following the Restatement, the First
Circuit held the defendants jointly and severally liable because the
wastes had commingled and the defendants had not met their burden of
proving divisibility. 39
ever, to ameliorate the potential harshness of CERCLA liability. See id. at 178-79
(noting that SARA directed EPA to offer settlements to de minimis generators);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 9 62 2(g) (1988). The defendants in this case were in fact
offered early settlements, but chose to litigate. ONeil, 883 F.2d at 179 n.3. For
a discussion of the provisions of SARA ameliorating defendants' potential liabil-
ity under CERCLA, see supra note 31.
37. O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 178. The court stated that it was "well settled that
Congress intended that the federal courts develop a uniform approach gov-
erning the use of joint and several liability in CERCLA actions." Id. The rule
adopted by most courts, and approved of by the First Circuit was that "damages
should be apportioned only if the defendant can demonstrate that the harm is
divisible." Id. The O'Neil court noted that courts had consistently been impos-
ing joint and several liability at the time Congress enacted SARA. Id. at 179.
The First Circuit further noted that although Congress considered imposing
joint and several liability when enacting SARA, Congress chose to leave the res-
olution of this issue to the courts. Id. Congress decided to leave the issue to be
resolved on a case-by-case basis, as was first approved in Chem-Dyne. Id.; see also
Alean, 964 F.2d at 268 (noting that deletion of statutory provision mandating
joint and several liability was not intended as rejection ofjoint and several liabil-
ity); United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir. 1989)
(noting that CERCLA imposes joint and several liability when harm is indivisi-
ble), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d
160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that CERCLA does not mandate imposition of
joint and several liability, but does permit joint and several liability when harm is
indivisible), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
38. O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 179.
39. Id. at 178-83. The district court in O'Neil had determined that the harm
was indivisible due to the commingling of wastes, and thus, had held the defend-
ants jointly and severally liable. O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 724-25
(D.R.I. 1988), aft'd, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071
(1990). The district court specifically stated that "[u]nder these circumstances,
where different substances possessing different qualities of toxicity and migra-
tory potential commingle, there is a synergistic impact upon the environment
that necessitates a finding that the consequent injury is indivisible." Id. at 725.
On appeal, the First Circuit noted that the district court followed the majority of
courts in adopting the Restatement formulation of joint and several liability.
O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 178. The First Circuit thus affirmed the district court, noting
that the defendants bore the burden of proving divisibility. Id. at 182. Although
the defendants argued that the harm was divisible, the court stated that
"[b]ecause there was substantial commingling of wastes, we think that any at-
tempt to apportion the costs incurred... would necessarily be arbitrary." Id. at
183 n. 11. The court recognized that "the only way [defendants] could have
demonstrated that they were limited contributors would have been to present
specific evidence concerning the whereabouts of their waste at all times after it
left their facilities." Id. at 182. Recognizing that clean-up efforts should be be-
gun expeditiously, the First Circuit did not want to delay clean-ups by engaging
in the lengthy, and usually impossible, task of tracing wastes to each responsible
party. Id. at 179 n.4. The First Circuit stated that the defendants' only remedy
11
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Although the district court in O'Neil did not resolve the issue on
summary judgment, several other courts have recently granted summary
judgment for the government, finding the defendants jointly and sever-
ally liable as a matter of law when wastes had commingled and defend-
ants had not presented evidence of divisibility.40 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently considered this issue in
United States v. Monsanto Co.4 1 The district court in Monsanto had granted
summary judgment for the government, stating that the defendants' ar-
guments concerning unfair allocation of costs should be considered at a
subsequent contribution proceeding. 42
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the defendants argued that the
would be to commence a contribution proceeding. Id. In a contribution pro-
ceeding, the defendants' burden of proving divisibility would be reduced and
the district court could apportion responsibility based on equitable factors the
court deemed appropriate. Id.
40. For a discussion of the cases holding defendants jointly and severally
liable on summary judgment due to commingling of wastes because defendants
could not create a genuine issue of material fact as to divisibility, see infra notes
41-52 and accompanying text.
41. 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989). In Mon-
santo, the defendant landowners leased a tract of land to a chemical manufactur-
ing corporation in 1972 to allow the corporation to store raw materials and
finished products in a warehouse at the site. Id. at 164. The corporation formed
a subsidiary that began using the facility to store and dispose of hazardous
wastes. Id. The subsidiary contracted with several hazardous waste generators
for transport, recycling and disposal of wastes. Id. From 1976 to 1980, the sub-
sidiary haphazardly deposited over 7,000 fifty-five gallon drums of waste on the
land. Id. The drums were stacked on top of each other, no records of the con-
tents of the drums were maintained and no safety procedures were followed. Id.
Many of the drums leaked toxic substances into the ground, which resulted in
commingling of the wastes and ultimately caused several fires and explosions.
Id. The EPA investigated the site in 1980 and concluded that the site posed "a
major fire hazard." Id. at 165. The EPA instituted a clean-up action and notified
the generators concerning potential responsibility for the clean-up costs. Id.
Twelve of the generators ultimately settled with the EPA. Id. In 1982, the EPA
and the state of South Carolina filed a complaint against the site owners and the
non-settling generators, alleging that the parties were jointly and severally liable
under CERCLA § 107(a). Id. at 165-66. The defendant owners contended that
they were innocent absentee landowners and the generators claimed, inter alia,
that none of their specific wastes contributed to the hazardous conditions at the
site. Id. at 166. The district court granted the government's motion for sum-
mary judgment, holding the defendants jointly and severally liable because the
harm at the site was "indivisible." United States v. South Carolina Recycling
and Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 995 (D.S.C. 1984), afd sub nom. United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106
(1989). The district court determined that the harm was indivisible because the
wastes had commingled and contributed synergistically to the harm at the site.
Id. at 994. The district court also noted that any questions of apportionment
based on volume should be considered at a contribution hearing. Id. at 995 &
n.8.
42. South Carolina Recycling, 653 F. Supp. at 995 & n.8. The district court
stated that volumetric contribution is not an accurate indicator of the environ-
mental and health dangers associated with the waste due to the varying toxicities
and migratory potentials of different hazardous wastes. Id. at 995. Cost appor-
1252 [Vol. 38: p. 1241
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district court erred in granting summary judgment because the harm at
the site was capable of apportionment. 4 3 The Fourth Circuit rejected
the defendants' argument, stating that because the wastes at the site had
commingled, the district court had no basis upon which to reasonably
apportion liability absent evidence as to the manner in which the chemi-
cals interacted.4 4 The Monsanto court stated that courts should deter-
mine whether the imposition of joint and several liability is appropriate
on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with federal common
law. 45 Following the Restatement, the Fourth Circuit held that the defend-
ants had not proven that a material issue of fact existed as to divisibility
and that summary judgment was appropriately granted. 4 6
In United States v. R. W. Meyer, Inc., the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit similarly considered whether imposing joint
tionment, the court stated, should not be considered until after the plaintiff has
been made whole. Id. at 995 n.8.
. 43. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171. The defendants conceded that the environ-
mental harm at the site constituted a "single harm," but argued that there was a
reasonable basis for apportioning the costs of that harm. Id. at 172. The de-
fendants contended that each of the off-site generators had sent a "potentially
identifiable volume" of waste to the site and that liability should have been ap-
portioned according to the volume each generator disposed of as compared to
the total volume of all wastes disposed of at the site. Id.
44. See id. at 172 (noting that in order to apportion liability, defendants
must present district court with "some evidence disclosing the individual and
interactive qualities of the substances deposited there"). The defendants in
Monsanto presented no evidence showing a relationship between the waste vol-
ume and the harm at the site. Id. The Fourth Circuit stated that "[c]ommon
sense counsels that a million gallons of certain substances could be mixed to-
gether without significant consequences, whereas a few pints of others improp-
erly mixed could result in disastrous consequences." Id. The court noted that
although volume may be relevant to harm in some cases, volume in this case
could not establish the relative harm caused by each generator. See id. at 172 &
n.27 ("Volumetric contributions provide a reasonable basis for apportioning lia-
bility only if it can be reasonably assumed, or has been demonstrated, that in-
dependent factors had no substantial effect on the harm to the environment.").
The Fourth Circuit stated that the type of evidence needed to establish divisibil-
ity here included information on the relative toxicity, migratory potential and
the synergistic capacity of the hazardous substances. Id. at 172 n.26.
45. Id. at 171.
46. Id. at 172. The court noted that under general tort law, when two or
more persons act independently and cause a single harm for which there is a
reasonable basis for apportionment, each person is liable only for that portion of
the harm he caused. Id. The Monsanto court also recognized, however, that
when such persons cause an indivisible harm, each is jointly and severally liable
for the entire harm. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A
(1965)). The burden of establishing a reasonable basis for apportionment of
harm is on the defendants. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B
(1965)). Thus, in order to escape joint and several liability at the summary judg-
ment stage, the defendants had to prove that genuine issues of material fact
existed as to whether the harm was divisible among the responsible parties. Id.
The defendants, however, presented no evidence showing any relationship be-
tween waste volume and the harm at the site. Id.
19931 1253
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and several liability on summaryjudgment was appropriate. 47 The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment ruling that R.W.
Meyer, as the owner of a site upon which hazardous wastes were re-
leased, was jointly and severally liable for removal costs. 48
In affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment for the
government, the Sixth Circuit in R. W Meyer stated that Congress in-
tended for courts to determine the scope of CERCLA liability under
evolving federal common-law principles. 4 9 The Sixth Circuit noted that
under federal common-law principles, courts have traditionally imposed
joint and several liability under CERCLA when the environmental harm
is indivisible and have allowed for apportionment when the harm is di-
visible. 50 Applying a clearly erroneous standard, the Sixth Circuit de-
clined to disturb the district court's factual finding that the harm was
indivisible. 5 1 The Sixth Circuit stated that the appropriate avenue for
R.W. Meyer was to seek to limit its liability in a subsequent contribution
action. 5 2
Prior to the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Alcan Alumi-
47. 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990). The
district court in R. W. Meyer had granted the government's motion for summaryjudgment on a suit brought for reimbursement of response costs incurred under
CERCLA based on a finding that the harm at the site was indivisible. United
States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 749 (W.D. Mich. 1987),
affd sub nom. United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990). On appeal, R.W. Meyer claimed that the dis-
trict court erred in granting summary judgment for the government and in hold-
ing it jointly and severally liable. R.W. Meyer, 889 F.2d at 1497.
48. R. W. Meyer, 889 F.2d at 1506. In R. W. Meyer, the defendant owned a
piece of property that it leased to Northernaire Company. Id. at 1498.
Northernaire used highly corrosive toxic materials in its manufacturing process,
which it deposited at the site. Id. Northernaire abandoned the site in 1981, and
the EPA, together with the Michigan Department of Natural Resources (MDNR),
conducted an investigation later that year that revealed significant levels of tox-
ins in the soil as well as discarded cyanide drums in a warehouse. Id. MDNR
and the EPA conducted a removal action in which they removed or neutralized
over 13,000 gallons of various toxic materials. Id. at 1498 n.2. When R.W.
Meyer and Northernaire refused to comply with an EPA request to pay for the
clean-up, the government filed an action under CERCLA, seeking reimburse-
ment of $270,000 in response costs incurred. Id. at 1499. The district court
granted the government's motion for summary judgment, finding the defend-
ants jointly and severally liable. Northernaire, 670 F. Supp. at 749.
49. See R. W. Meyer, 889 F.2d at 1507 (noting that Congress intended courts
to determine scope of liability under " 'traditional and evolving principles of
common law' . . . 'where two or more persons cause a single and indivisible
harm, each is subject to liability for the entire harm' " (quoting United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983))). The Sixth
Circuit stated that the burden of proving divisibility of the harm lies with the
responsible parties. Id.
50. Id. In affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment for the
government, the Sixth Circuit noted that the district court had followed these
principles and determined that the harm was indivisible. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1507. The Sixth Circuit noted that delaying the equitable appor-
1254 [Vol. 38: p. 1241
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num Corp. (Alcan)5 3 , the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York decided a factually similar Case also entitled United
States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan New York). 5 4 In Alcan New York, the
government brought suit against eighty-three defendants under CER-
CLA for response costs incurred in the clean-up of a hazardous waste
site, but every defendant except Alcan ultimately settled out of court.55
The government sought to hold Alcan jointly and severally liable for the
balance of the response costs. 5 6 Alcan a'gued that it should not be held
jointly and severally liable because the harm caused by its wastes was
divisible from the harm caused by the other defendants. 5 7 The district
court, however, granted the government's summary judgment motion
against Alcan, finding that the wastes had commingled and that Alcan
had not created a genuine issue of fact as to divisibility. 58
tionment hearing until after the government has recovered its costs is supported
by the legislative history of SARA, which states:
This section clarifies and confirms the right of a person held jointly and
severally liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from other poten-
tially liable parties, when the person believes that it has assumed a
share of the cleanup or cost that may be greater than its equitable share
under the circumstances.
Id. at 1507 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861). The Sixth Circuit stated that "[t]o the extent
that Meyer can demonstrate the divisibility of the harm and that it paid more
than its fair share, it will be entitled to relief in its action for contribution cur-
rently pending against the other defendants." Id. at 1508.
53. 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir.), reh'g denied, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17371 (July
27, 1992).
54. 755 F. Supp. 531 (N.D.N.Y. 1991), revd in part and remanded, 990 F.2d
711 (2d Cir. 1993) (Alcan New York). Alcan New York was also a CERCLA case
involving a release of Alcan's hazardous substances, but at a different location.
Id.
55. Id. at 534. In Alcan New York, the government sought to recover under
CERCLA for response costs incurred in a clean-up of a hazardous waste site
formerly owned by Pollution Abatement Services of Oswego, New York (PAS).
Id. at 531. PAS received various chemical wastes for treatment during the 1970s
and the site eventually became contaminated due to leaking drums, overflowing
lagoons and surface run-off. Id. at 532. During the 1970s, Alcan had arranged
for treatment and disposal of over 4,600,000 gallons of its wastes at the PAS
facility. Id. In cleaning this site, the government incurred over $12 million in
response costs. Id. at 531.
56. Id. at 534. The 82 other defendants settled with the government for a
total of $9 million. Id. The government sought to hold Alcan liable for the $3
million balance of the response costs. Id.
57. Id. Alcan's wastes consisted solely of metal by-products. Id. at 535. As
a result, Alcan asserted that any harm that its wastes could have potentially
caused was limited to soil contamination. Id. at 541. Moreover, Alcan argued
that EPA's studies of the site indicated that the concentration of metal contami-
nation in the soil was not high enough to warrant concern. Id. Thus, Alcan
argued that the harm from its metal wastes was divisible from the harm caused
by other defendants because no remediation of the soil was necessary. Id.
58. Id. at 541. The court summarily dismissed Alcan's argument, stating
that the harm at the site was indivisible because the wastes had commingled. Id.
at 541-42.
15
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III. CASE ANALYSIS
A. Facts and Procedural History
The facts in United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan),59 were un-
disputed.60 From 1965 to 1989, Alcan's manufacturing process resulted
in a by-product that consisted of an oily emulsion containing certain
hazardous substances. 6 1 Alcan's wastes were disposed of at the Butler
Tunnel Site (the Site) in Pittston, Pennsylvania. 6 2 The Site borders the
Susquehanna River and contains five square miles of mines that are ac-
cessible via surface boreholes and that drain into the Butler Tunnel.63
59. 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir.), reh'g denied, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17371 (July
27, 1992).
60. Id. at 255.
61. Id. at 256. Alcan's manufacturing process at its Oswego, New York
plant involved the hot-rolling of aluminum ingots, which were cooled by circula-
tion of an emulsion containing 95% deionized water and 5% mineral oil. Id.
When the emulsion was circulated, fragments of copper, chromium, cadmium,
lead and zinc were deposited in the emulsion. Id. These substances are consid-
ered hazardous under CERCLA. Id. Although Alcan removed and filtered the
used emulsion, fragments of hazardous substances remained in the discarded
emulsion. Id. From 1978 to 1979, Alcan contracted with the Mahler Company,
a government licensed waste processor, to dispose of its used emulsion. Id. at
256 & n.l. During this time, Alcan produced over two million gallons of the
emulsion. Id. at 256. Mahler disposed of over 30,000 gallons of Alcan's wastes
at the site in question. Id. Alcan argued that the government did not prove that
its emulsion was actually found at the site. Id. at 256 n.3. The Third Circuit,
however, said that this fact did not insulate Alcan from liability. Id. The court
noted that under CERCLA, liability could attach even if none of the hazardous
substances contained in Alcan's emulsion were found at the site, because Alcan
admitted that Mahler disposed of the emulsion at the site. Id. Although Alcan
claimed that it did not know Mahler was disposing of its wastes in an unsafe
manner, the Third Circuit stated that knowledge was irrelevant to the issue of
liability. Id.
Alcan further contended that the levels of the hazardous substances in the
post-filtered emulsion were below a level that could be considered toxic. Id.
The Third Circuit, however, affirmed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of the government on this issue. Id. at 259-61. The Alcan court
noted that CERCLA's definition of "hazardous substance" contains no quantita-
tive requirement or specific concentration level of toxicity. Id. at 259.
62. Id. at 255. The Site is listed on the EPA's National Priorities List under
CERCLA § 105. Id. Section 105 requires the EPA to prepare lists of sites
throughout the country that pose the greatest risks to human health and the
environment and to specify procedures for reducing these risks. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605(a) (1988).
63. Alcan, 964 F.2d at 255. The Butler Tunnel is a 7500 foot tunnel that
feeds directly into the Susquehanna. Id. The boreholes are essentially airholes.
Id. at 256. In the late 1970s, Hi-Way Auto Service permitted Mahler and numer-
ous other waste transport companies to deposit liquid wastes into a borehole on
its property. Id. This borehole led directly into the mines at the Site. Id. Mah-
ler collected wastes from numerous companies and disposed of two million gal-
lons of hazardous wastes through the borehole. Id. Mahler often commingled
Alcan's wastes with discharges from other facilities before disposing of the waste
through the borehole. Id. at 256 n.2. The wastes were to remain at the Site
indefinitely. Id. at 256.
1256
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In 1985, 100,000 gallons of water containing hazardous wastes were
released from the Site into the Susquehanna. 64 The EPA instituted a
response action and incurred over $1,300,000 in response costs due to
actual and threatened releases from the Site.65 The EPA issued letters
in 1986 to the PRPs concerning their potential liability for the clean-up
of the Site. 66 In 1989, the government filed a complaint against Alcan
and nineteen other defendants seeking recovery of the response costs
incurred in the clean-up of the Susquehanna. 67 All of the defendants
except Alcan ultimately reached settlement agreements with the
government. 6
8
After the other nineteen defendants agreed to settle the case, the
government moved for summary judgment against Alcan to collect the
unpaid portion of its response costs. 69 The government instituted the
action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. 70 The case was subsequently referred to a magistrate
judge, who recommended that the court grant the government's motion
for summary judgment based on the rationale of the district court in
Alcan New York. 7 1 Following the magistrate's recommendation, the dis-
trict court entered judgment against Alcan for $473,790.18.72
64. Id. at 256. This release contained the wastes that had been discharged
into Hi-Way's borehole. Id.
65. Id. at 256, 270. The EPA's response took over a year and included con-
taining an oily material on the Susquehanna and removing and disposing of
161,000 pounds of contaminated debris. Id. at 256. As part of its response ac-
tion, the EPA also monitored, sampled and analyzed the surrounding air and
water. Id.
66. Id. at 256. The letters invited the PRPs to conduct their own studies of
the Site and asked the PRPs to enter settlement agreements with the EPA. Id.
Several of the PRPs entered into negotiations with the EPA in an attempt to
settle their liability. Id. Alcan, however, did not attempt to settle. Id.
67. Id. at 257.
68. Id. Initially, 17 of the defendants agreed to a consent decree that reim-
bursed the government for some of the response costs. Id. In 1990, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania entered the decree.
Id. Two of the remaining defendants subsequently executed a second consent
decree, which was also entered by the district court in 1990. Id. The total settle-
ment amount was for approximately $ 830,000. See id. at 270 (noting that district
court found Alcan liable for $ 473,000 when total response cost was $
1,302,000).
69. Id. at 257. Alcan cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that its
emulsion did not fall within the definition of "hazardous substance" as defined
by CERCLA because it contained below ambient levels of copper, cadmium,
chromium, lead and zinc. Id. Alcan also argued that its emulsion could not have
caused the release or caused any of the response costs incurred. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 255 & 257.
72. Id. at 255. The judgment represented the difference between the
amount of response costs that the government incurred in the clean-up and the
amount that the government received from settlements with the other defend-
ants. Id.
17
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B. Analysis
The Alcan case reached the Third Circuit on Alcan's appeal from the
district court's grant of summary judgment for the government. 73 After
setting forth a detailed explanation of the facts, the Third Circuit began
its discussion with a broad overview of CERCLA,7 4 The court noted
that CERCLA should be construed liberally in order to effectuate its pri-
mary goal of ensuring that those parties responsible for environmental
harm pay the costs of remedying that harm. 75
Alcan first argued that the district court erred in holding it liable for
the costs that the government incurred while cleaning the Susque-
hanna. 76 In support of its argument, Alcan asserted that the level of
hazardous substances in its emulsion was below that which occurs natu-
rally. 77 While the Third Circuit agreed with the district court's finding
that CERCLA does not impose any quantitative requirement in the defi-
nition of hazardous substance, the court also recognized the validity of
Alcan's argument that this definition is overly broad in that it could in-
clude virtually every substance known to man. 78 The court stated that
73. Id. at 257. The Third Circuit noted that the standard of review was
plenary, and that it had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id.
74. Id. at 255-59.
75. See id. at 258 (noting that principal goal of CERCLA is to ensure "that
those who caused chemical harm bear the costs of that harm" (quoting S. Doc.
No. 14, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1983, reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT
OF 1980, SENATE COMMITrEE OF ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS ("A LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY") 320)).
76. Id. at 259.
77. Id. Alcan asserted that the court must read a threshold concentration
level into the definition of "hazardous substances." Id. The United States
Chamber of Commerce joined Alcan in this argument. Id. In contrast, the gov-
ernment contended that because Congress did not include any quantitative re-
quirement in its definition of "hazardous substance," the court should not read
a threshold level into the plain language of the statute. Id. The government
asserted that it was for Congress, not the courts, to address any argument that
wastes containing below ambient levels of hazardous substances should not be
considered hazardous. Id.
78. Id. at 259-61. The Third Circuit first noted that CERCLA's plain lan-
guage contains no quantitative requirement in its definition of hazardous sub-
stance. Id. at 260 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988)). The Alcan court
stated that for a substance to be considered hazardous, the substance must
merely fall within one of the categories of hazardous substances delineated in
CERCLA. Id. The court also noted that CERCLA's legislative history provided
no support for Alcan's assertion. Id. The court specifically stated that "[iut is
difficult to imagine that Congress intended to impose a quantitative requirement
on the definition of hazardous substances and thereby permit a polluter to add
to the total pollution but avoid liability because the amount of its own pollution
was minimal." Id. at 260. The Third Circuit also recognized that nearly all the
relevant case law has held that CERCLA's definition of hazardous waste does
not contain a quantitative requirement. Id. at 261. At least one court, however,
has construed CERCLA as having a quantitative requirement in its definition of
hazardous waste. See United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 22 ENV'T REP. CAS.
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its ultimate holding requiring that defendants be given an opportunity
to prove divisibility of harm would quell industry's fear that CERCLA
liability will reach too far. 79
Alcan next argued that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment for the government because Alcan's emulsion did not fall
within the definition of "hazardous substances" set forth in the EPA reg-
ulations. 80 The Third Circuit rejected Alcan's argument, agreeing with
the district court that the substances in Alcan's emulsion were "hazard-
ous" under CERCLA. 8 t Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed sum-
(BNA) 1736, 1739 (D.N.H. 1984) (dismissing CERCLA case on ground that de-
fendant "did not cause or contribute to cause the disposal of any hazardous
wastes . . . which exceeded the threshold quantity established by the EPA for
hazardous wastes").
79. See Alcan, 964 F.2d at 261 n.13 ("[T]his definition of 'hazardous sub-
stances' is so broad that it encompasses virtually everything .... However, our
holding with respect to divisibility of harm ... should assuage Alcan's fear that
liability under CERCLA will be as far-reaching as the definition of hazardous
substances."). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding and how it may
lessen the potential scope of liability under CERCLA, see infra notes 108-29 and
accompanying text.
80. Alcan, 964 F.2d at 261. Alcan argued that the substances contained in
its emulsion were not "listed" hazardous substances under CERCIA. Id. Alcan
claimed that the district court erroneously based its holding on the fact that its
wastes contained minimal levels of certain compounds listed in the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations. Id. The Code of Federal Regulations contains a list of ele-
ments, compounds and wastes that are designated as hazardous under CERCLA.
40 C.F.R. § 302.4, table 302.4 (1992). Alcan argued that substances listed in
Table 302.4 must have certain "Reportable Quantities" (RQs) and "Chemical
Abstract Service Registry Numbers" (CASRNs) to be considered hazardous
under CERCLA. Alcan, 964 F.2d at 262. The EPA defines an RQas "that quan-
tity, as set forth in this part, the release of which requires notification pursuant
to this part." 40 C.F.R. § 302.3 (1992). Under CERCLA § 103, "the person in
charge of a facility is required to notify EPA immediately of any release of a
hazardous substance in a quantity equal to or exceeding the RQ for that sub-
stance." Alcan, 964 F.2d at 262 n.15. A CASRN is an identification number for
each chemical listed in Table 302.4. 40 C.F.R. § 302.4, table 302.4 (1992). Al-
can asserted that because Table 302.4 does not provide RQs or CASRNs for the
generic compounds in Alcan's emulsion, the court should not consider these
compounds to be "listed" hazardous substances. Alcan, 964 F.2d at 262. In con-
trast, the government contended that the generic designations in Table 302.4
are merely substantive categories of hazardous substances that trigger CERCLA
liability, and that CERCLA does not require that a substance have an RO or a
CASRN to be considered hazardous. Id.
81. Alcan, 964 F.2d at 261-64. The Third Circuit outlined its reasoning as
follows:
First, section 101(14) of CERCLA defines a hazardous substance to
include "any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33
[the Clean Water Act]." The generic compounds contained in Alcan's
emulsion are "listed" under 40 C.F.R. § 401.15, the list of toxic pollu-
tants promulgated pursuant to section 1317(a). Thus, there is no need
to reach the significance of RQs or CASRNs under Table 302.4 to de-
termine whether generic compounds are "hazardous" by virtue of their
listing under that Table.
Id. at 262 (citations omitted).
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mary judgment on this issue as well.8 2
The Third Circuit next rejected Alcan's argument that in order to
recover response costs, the government must prove that Alcan's emul-
sion caused or contributed to the release of hazardous substances or
caused the government to incur response costs.8 3 The Third Circuit de-
termined that CERCLA imposed no such causation requirement.8 4 The
court noted that CERCLA requires only that the government prove: 1)
that Alcan's hazardous substances were deposited at the Site; 2) that
there was a release of hazardous substances; and 3) that the release
caused the government to incur response costs.8 5 Finding that the gov-
ernment had met all three requirements, the Third Circuit upheld the
district court's grant of summary judgment on this issue.8 6
The Third Circuit also rejected Alcan's contention that its emulsion
fell within CERCLA's "petroleum exclusion" and was thus excluded
The Third Circuit stated that "the district court ... correctly concluded that
the absence of an RQ or CASRN number does not signify that the substance is
not 'hazardous.' " Id. at 263. Thus, the only question presented was whether
the substances in Alcan's emulsion were "listed in any of the statutory and regu-
latory schemes incorporated by section 101(14) .... " Id. Alcan's emulsion
contained traces of cadmium, chromium, copper, lead and zinc, which are listed
as hazardous substances under regulations promulgated pursuant to the Clean
Water Act. Id. Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that Alcan's emulsion con-
tained hazardous substances under CERCLA. Id.
Alcan also argued that EPA did not intend for generic categories of listed
substances to constitute hazardous wastes in every circumstance. Id. at 263. Al-
can stressed that EPA has stated that "CERCLA liability may still attach to re-
leases of specific compounds that are within one of the generic listings but not
specifically listed in Table 302.4." Id. (quoting 50 Fed. Reg. 13,472-73 (empha-
sis added)). Alcan argued that if the EPA had intended generic categories to
constitute hazardous substances in every case, it would have used the word
"shall" instead of the word "may" in the foregoing regulation. Id. The Third
Circuit, however, stated that "the use of the word 'may' simply reflects EPA's
recognition that CERCLA liability attaches only if all elements of a CERCLA
cause of action are established." Id. (quoting City of New York v. Exxon Corp.,
766 F. Supp. 177, 183 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
Alcan further asserted that the district court's construction of CERCLA was
inconsistent with environmental policy because it imposed liability on genera-
tors of purportedly "hazardous" substances even though the substances pose no
threat to the environment. Id. at 264. The Third Circuit stated that because the
government responds to releases that threaten the environment, it is the release
itself, rather than a particular generator's waste, that justifies response costs. Id.
The court also stated that the fact that a particular generator's waste would not,
by itself, justify a response action, was irrelevant because Alcan's argument
would not take into account the potentially harmful synergistic effects of several
generators' wastes at a multi-generator site. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 264-66. The Alcan court examined CERCLA's plain meaning, the
legislative history and the relevant case law, in concluding that CERCLA im-
poses no causation requirement. Id.
85. Id. at 266.
86. Id.
20
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from liability under CERCLA. 87 The Third Circuit held that the district
court properly determined that Alcan's emulsion did not fall within the
exception because the petroleum exclusion does not apply to oils that
have had hazardous substances added to them.88 Thus, the Third Cir-
cuit also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on this
issue.8 9
Alcan's final argument was that the district court's conclusion that
CERCLA contains no threshold level in its definition of hazardous sub-
stances, coupled with its finding that CERCLA requires no showing of
causation, will result in unfair imposition of liability against industry. 90
Alcan argued that thus construed, CERCLA would impose liability on
virtually every hazardous waste generator, even those who could not
have individually caused any harm. 9 1 The government countered that
87. Id. CERCLA § 101(14) provides, in pertinent part:
The term [hazardous substance] does not include petroleum, including
crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically
listed or designated as a hazardous substance.., and the term does not
include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquified natural gas, or syn-
thetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic
gas).
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(1988).
Alcan asserted that the EPA has previously extended this exclusion to used
oil containing levels of hazardous substances equal to or below levels found in
unprocessed oil. Alcan, 964 F.2d at 266. Contending that this exclusion applied
to its emulsion, Alcan noted that its emulsion is a "used oil" containing concen-
trations of cadmium, chromium, copper, lead and zinc below the levels in un-
processed oil. Id.
88. Alcan, 964 F.2d at 266. The Alcan court noted that although the EPA
has extended the petroleum exclusion to oil that naturally contains low levels of
hazardous substances, the EPA has not extended the exclusion to oil containing
added hazardous substances. Id. The Third Circuit stated that its interpretation
of the petroleum exclusion was consistent with CERCLA's legislative history.
See id. (noting that legislative history indicates petroleum exclusion was intended
for oil spills and was not intended for releases of oil infused with hazardous
substances due to use) (citing S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31
(1980), reprinted in 1 A LEGISLArIvE HISTORY 405). Alcan did not dispute the fact
that its manufacturing process added hazardous substances to its emulsion. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 267.
91. Id. Alcan argued that the definition of"hazardous substance" rendered
hazardous virtually every substance known to man. Id. For example, under this
definition, even federally approved drinking water could be considered hazard-
ous. Id. Several commentators agree that CERCLA's liability scheme may be
unfair. See, e.g., Barr, supra note 2, at 924 (stating that CERCLA is "the harshest
liability scheme around" (quoting Ruth Simon, Deals that Smell Bad, FORBES, May
15, 1989, at 49)); Balcke, Note, supra note 1, at 130 (noting that low thresholds
for causation and limited defenses allowed by CERCLA impose virtually abso-
lute liability on defendants). But see Colloquy, supra note 3, at 1524 (noting that
weak causation standard balances competing interests of industry in accurately
assessing liability with government's interest in rapid clean-up).
The Third Circuit noted that the Restatement also recognizes the potential
unfairness of holding defendants jointly and several liable in a multi-generator
case. See Alcan, 964 F.2d at 267. The Restatement notes:
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defendants must be held accountable for environmental harm brought
about by the cumulative acts of multiple defendants even if no single
defendant alone could have produced the harm.92 The government fur-
ther argued that if liability was not imposed in this manner, each individ-
ual defendant in a multi-generator case could potentially escape liability
because of the low concentrations of hazardous substances in each
party's waste.93 As a result, the government would have to pay for the
clean-up necessitated by the defendants' accumulated wastes.9 4 The
Third Circuit found merit in both arguments and determined that the
Restatement's provisions for joint and several liability provide a fair reso-
lution of the conflicting interests.9 5 The court noted that the imposition
of joint and several liability in accordance with the Restatement is consis-
tent with CERCLA's legislative history and with the views of other
courts that have addressed the issue. 96
A very troublesome question arises where the acts of each of two or
more parties, standing alone, would not be wrongful, but together they
cause harm to the plaintiff. If several defendants independently pollute
a stream, the impurities traceable to each may be negligible and harm-
less, but all together may render the water entirely unfit for use. The
difficulty lies in the fact that each defendant alone would have commit-
ted no tort. There would have been no negligence, and no nuisance,
since the individual use of the stream would have been a reasonable
use, and no harm would have resulted.
PROSSER, supra note 29, § 52 at 322.
92. Alcan, 964 F.2d at 267.
93. Id.
94. Id. The government asserted that the strong public policy interests in
forcing generators at multi-generator sites to pay the clean-up costs oitweigh a
defendant's interest in avoiding liability even when viewed individually, a de-
fendant has acted in an environmentally sound manner. Id. In considering the
merits of the government's argument, the Third Circuit noted that one court has
stated:
[I]t is entirely possible for a hazardous waste facility to be comprised of
entirely small amounts from many contributors. If each PRP could
make [Alcan's] argument, i.e., that its particular contribution did not
warrant remediation and thus that it should not be liable for any costs,
no party would be liable, despite the fact that the site, as a whole,
needed to be cleaned up and the government incurred costs in doing
SO.
Id. (quoting United States v. Western Processing Co., 734 F. Supp. 930, 937
(W.D. Wash. 1990)).
95. Id. at 268.
96. Id. at 267-68. Initially, the Alcan court noted that CERCLA does not
expressly provide for joint and several liability, and that Congress deleted from
the final bill a provision imposing joint and several liability. Id. at 268. The
Third Circuit further noted, however, that several other courts have interpreted
the legislative history as requiring courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis,
whether joint and several liability is appropriate. Id. at 267-68; see also United
States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir. 1989) ("CERCLA has
been interpreted to impose joint and several liability when the environmental
harm is indivisible ... and to allow for apportionment when two or more per-
sons independently are responsible for a single harm that is divisible."), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989)
22
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The Third Circuit's decision in Alcan departed, however, from the
holdings of other United States circuit courts of appeals by reversing the
district court's summary judgment ruling.9 7 The district court in Alcan
had ruled that Alcan was jointly and severally liable for the govern-
ment's response costs associated with the clean-up of the Susque-
hanna. 98 The district court, following the reasoning of Alcan New York,
granted the government's summary judgment motion because the
wastes had commingled and because Alcan had not proven that any gen-
uine issues of material fact existed as to divisibility. 99 Although the
Third Circuit determined that joint and several liability was appropriate
in CERCLA cases, it remanded the case to the district court to conduct
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the environmental harm
was divisible. 0 0 The Third Circuit based its ruling on the Restatement's
general principles of joint and several liability.' 0 ' The Third Circuit
("[C]ourts have continued to impose joint and several liability on a regular basis,
reasoning that where all of the contributing causes cannot fairly be traced, Con-
gress intended for those proven at least partially culpable to bear the cost of the
uncertainty."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990); United States v. Monsanto Co.,
858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988) ("While CERCLA does not mandate the im-
position ofjoint and several liability, it permits it in cases of indivisible harm."),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.
Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (stating that provision for joint and several
liability was "omitted in order to have the scope of liability determined under
common law principles, where a court performing a case by case evaluation of
the complex factual scenarios associated with multiple-generator waste sites will
assess the propriety of applying joint and several liability on an individual
basis").
97. Compare Alcan, 964 F.2d at 269-70 with R.W. Meyer, 889 F.2d at 1507
(affirming district court's grant of summary judgment holding defendants jointly
and severally liable) and Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171 (same).
98. Alcan, 964 F.2d at 269. The district court adopted the magistratejudge's recommendation that Alcan should be held jointly and severally liable
because the case was virtually identical to United States v. Alcan Aluminum
Corp., 755 F. Supp. 531 (N.D.N.Y. 1991), rev 'd in part and remanded, 990 F.2d 711
(2d Cir. 1993) (Alcan New York). Alcan, 964 F.2d at 255. For an overview of Alcan
New York, see supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
99. See Alcan, 964 F.2d at 270 ("[I]n light of their belief that Alcan New York
was dispositive of the arguments advanced by Alcan in this case, neither the
magistrate judge nor the district court engaged in any factual investigation con-
cerning the divisibility of the environmental harm .
100. Id.
101. Id. The court consulted the Restatement for guidance in determining
whether Alcan should be held jointly and severally liable for the response costs
remaining after the settlements. Id. at 268. The Third Circuit noted that the
Restatement specifically provides an example of divisibility of harm in the context
of water pollution. Id. at 269. The Restatement comments that:
There are other kinds of harm which, while not so clearly marked out as
severable into distinct parts, are still capable of division upon a reason-
able and rational basis, and of fair apportionment among the causes
responsible .... Such apportionment is commonly made in cases of
private nuisance, where the pollution of a stream.., has interfered with
the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his land.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A cmt. d (1976)).
12631993]
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stated that if Alcan could prove that the environmental harm was divisi-
ble and that the damages were reasonably capable of apportionment,
Alcan would only be held liable for that portion of the response costs
attributable to its waste. 10 2 The Third Circuit rejected the govern-
ment's argument that the harm was presumptively indivisible because
the various wastes at the site had commingled.' 0 3 Significantly, the
Third Circuit also stated that the divisibility issue should be resolved at
the initial liability phase rather than in a subsequent contribution pro-
ceeding. 10 4 Based on its determination that Alcan must be given the
opportunity in an evidentiary hearing to present evidence of divisibility,
the Third Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment for the
government. 10
5
102. Alcan, 964 F.2d at 269. The court noted that Alcan had the burden of
demonstrating that the damages were capable of apportionment. Id. According
to the Restatement, placing the burden on the defendant avoids:(tihe injustice of allowing a proved wrongdoer who has in fact caused
harm to the plaintiff to escape liability merely because the harm which
he has inflicted has combined with similar harm inflicted by other
wrongdoers, and the nature of the harm itself has made it necessary
that evidence be produced before [it] can be apportioned. In such a
case the defendant may justly be required to assume the burden of pro-
ducing that evidence, or if he is not able to do so, of bearing the full
responsibility. As between the proved tortfeasor who has clearly
caused some harm, and the entirely innocent plaintiff, any hardship due
to lack of evidence as to the extent of the harm should fall upon the
former.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. b(2) (1976).
Following this rationale, the Third Circuit stated that if Alcan could demon-
strate that its emulsion, when mixed with the other wastes at the site, could not
have contributed to any of the harm, Alcan would not be liable for any of the
response costs. Alcan, 964 F.2d at 270. But if Alcan was unable to prove either
that the harm was divisible and that the damages were capable of reasonable
apportionment or that its emulsion could not have caused any of the harm, Al-
can would be liable for the full amount of the unrecovered response costs. Id.
103. Alcan, 964 F.2d at 270 n.29. The court stated that " 'commingled'
waste is not synonymous with 'indivisible' harm." Id.
104. Id. The Third Circuit recognized that other courts have held that in a
contribution proceeding, a defendant may present evidence that it has paid for
more of the harm than it caused. See id. (citing United States v. R.W. Meyer,
Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that defendant could attempt
to demonstrate divisibility of harm in contribution proceeding), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1057 (1990) and United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 173 & n.29 (4th
Cir. 1988) (noting that proportionate fault could be considered in contribution
proceeding), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989)). The Third Circuit believed,
however, that it would be more equitable to industry to conduct the divisibility
inquiry at the initial liability phase rather than at the contribution phase. See id.
("In our view, the logical consequence of delaying the apportionment determi-
nation may well be drastic, for it seems clear that a defendant could easily be
strong-armed into settling where other defendants have settled in order to avoid
being held liable for the remainder of the response costs."). The Third Circuit
noted that Alcan's liability appeared disproportionate compared to the other de-
fendants' liability because Alcan represented only 5% of defendant pool but was
held liable for 36% of the clean-up costs. Id.
105. Id. at 270 n.29. The Third Circuit reasoned that if the apportionment
1264
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Other United States circuit courts of appeals that have addressed
this issue have upheld district courts' grants of summary judgment on
the grounds that environmental harm was presumptively indivisible due
to commingling of wastes and the defendants had not met their burden
of creating a genuine issue of material fact with respect to divisibility. 0 6
The Alcan court, however, stressing the intensely factual nature of deter-
mining the divisibility of harm, instructed the district court to conduct a
full evidentiary hearing to allow Alcan to attempt to prove divisibility. 107
IV. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit's reversal of the district court's grant of summary
judgment on the issue of divisibility of harm marks the first time that a
United States circuit court of appeals has reversed a United States Dis-
trict Court's determination that the defendants had not created a genu-
ine issue of material fact with respect to divisibility.10 8 Significantly, the
Third Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment
for the government despite the fact that Alcan did not present any spe-
cific evidence that the harm was in fact divisible. 10 9 Thus, in future
issue was delayed until a subsequent contribution proceeding, defendants could
easily be coerced into settling by the threat of joint and several liability. Id.
106. See United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir.
1989) (holding defendants jointly and severally liable on summary judgment be-
cause wastes had commingled and defendants had not presented sufficient evi-
dence of divisibility) cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); United States v. Monsanto
Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 n.22, 172 (4th Cir. 1988) (same) cert. dened, 490 U.S. 1106
(1989).
107. Alcan, 964 F.2d at 269. The court stated that "Alcan's burden in at-
tempting to prove the divisibility of harm to the Susquehanna River is substan-
tial, and the analysis will be factually complex as it will require an assessment of
the relative toxicity, migratory potential and synergistic capacity of the hazard-
ous waste at issue." Id.
For a discussion of the decisions upholding district courts' grants of sum-
mary judgment holding defendants jointly and severally liable because the envi-
ronmental harm was presumptively indivisible when the wastes had commingled
and defendants had failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding
divisibility, see supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
108. See Daniel P. Harris & David M. Milan, Avoiding Joint and Several Liability
under CERCLA, 23 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1726, 1726 (Nov. 6, 1992) (noting that
Alcan court was first court to remand government response cost action to district
court with instructions to make factual determination regarding divisibility of
harm and appropriateness of joint and several liability). Although the district
court in Alcan did not make a specific finding that the harm was indivisible, be-
cause Alcan and Alcan New York were almost identical factually, the district court
adopted the holding of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of New York in United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp. 531
(N.D.N.Y. 1991). See Alcan, 964 F.2d at 270 (noting that neither magistrate
judge nor district court engaged in any fact-finding concerning divisibility of
harm). Thus, the district court essentially did make a specific finding that Alcan
had not created a genuine issue of material fact as to divisibility.
109. Alcan, 964 F.2d at 269-70. Alcan vaguely asserted that its wastes
could not have contributed to response costs, without presenting any specific
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cases in the Third Circuit, a finding that hazardous wastes at a multi-
generator site have commingled may not result in a summary judgment
ruling that the defendants are jointly and severally liable even if the de-
fendants present no specific evidence of divisibility." 10
The Third Circuit's decision in Alcan is suspect in two respects.
First, although it followed the federal common law to date in applying
the Restatement to CERCLA liability,' "the Third Circuit may have ne-
glected to consider the underlying policy goal of CERCLA to expedite
clean-ups.11 2 Second, it does not appear that Alcan presented sufficient
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding
divisibility. 1 13
evidence of divisibility of harm. Id. Although the Third Circuit expressed no
opinion on the merits of Alcan's contention, it determined that Alcan had cre-
ated a genuine issue of material fact with respect to divisibility. See id. at 270
(remanding case and instructing district court to permit Alcan to attempt to
prove divisibility). The Third Circuit thus held that the district court had im-
properly granted summary judgment for the government. Id. at 271.
The Third Circuit's reversal of the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment is difficult to justify in light of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). In Celotex, the United States Supreme Court held that a court may ap-
propriately grant summary judgment against a nonmoving party when that party
fails to produce sufficient evidence to support an essential element of its claim.
Id. In Alcan, Alcan bore the burden of proving at trial that the harm from its
wastes was divisible. Alcan, 964 F.2d at 270. On appeal to the Third Circuit,
however, Alcan did not produce any evidence supporting this essential element
to its case. Id. at 269-70.
110. See Alcan, 964 F.2d at 269 & n.29 (noting that district court erred in
granting government's summary judgment motion without first conducting fac-
tual inquiry regarding divisibility of harm and rejecting government's argument
that commingling of wastes necessitates finding of indivisibility of harm). The
Third Circuit's ruling thus forecloses the possibility of the government winning
a CERCLA case on summary judgment even when generators at sites containing
commingled wastes present no specific evidence of divisibility. See id. at 269
(noting "the intensely factual nature of the divisibility issue . .. [which] high-
light[s] the district court error in granting summary judgment in favor of EPA
without conducting a hearing").
111. For a discussion of federal decisions prior to Alcan applying the princi-
ples of the Restatement to CERCLA liability, see supra notes 26-52 and accompa-
nying text.
112. For a further discussion of the underlying policy goals of CERCLA,
see supra notes 2, 3, 18 and accompanying text.
113. See Alcan, 964 F.2d at 269 (Alcan vaguely asserting that its compounds
could not have caused or contributed to release); cf. United States v. Alcan Alu-
minum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 722-23 (2d Cir. 1993) (Alcan making specific con-
tention, supported with expert affidavits, that response costs were incurred due
to compounds not present in its wastes). In light of the lack of specific evidence
set forth by Alcan regarding the divisibility of harm, Alcan did not produce evi-
dence supporting an essential element to its case on which it bore the burden of
proof at trial. Accordingly, the Third Circuit should have granted the govern-
ment's motion for summary judgment. See Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986) (holding that summary judgment is appropriately granted
against nonmoving party who failed to produce evidence supporting essential
element of its case on which nonmoving party bore burden of proof at trial).
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Following Alcan, in the Third Circuit, courts will now be required to
conduct complex factual hearings to determine whether the harm from
commingled wastes is in fact divisible. 1 4 As a result, clean-ups may be
delayed if defendants litigate the issue of joint and several liability."15
Because neither the government nor CERCLA defendants wish to be-
come involved in lengthy and costly litigation involving divisibility of
harm, however, both parties will often attempt to reach settlement
agreements. Prior to Alcan, CERCLA defendants have traditionally set-
tled quickly with the government, realizing that if the government
proved a prima facie case of liability against them in court, they would
probably be held jointly and severally liable on summary judgment. 1 16
However, because the Alcan decision means that the government can no
longer be assured of holding defendants jointly and severally liable on
summary judgment even when defendants present no specific evidence
of divisibility, the government's bargaining power will now be signifi-
cantly weakened. 1 17 As a result of the Third Circuit's decision in Alcan,
114. See,4lcan, 964 F.2d at 269 (noting that divisibility issue is intensely fac-
tual in nature and district court erred in granting summary judgment without
conducting hearing); see also Harris & Milan, supra note 108, at 1726 (stating that
"Alcan decision can be read as a signal to the lower courts that they must not
indiscriminately impose joint and several liability on superfund defendants.").
Requiring these hearings on divisibility will place a substantial burden on
the district courts. Determining what party contributed what waste and in what
amount, if not impossible in a given situation, will at least necessitate technical,
complex factual inquiries. See United States v. Franklin P. Tyson Gen. Devices,
1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84-2663, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 1988) (noting that where
different hazardous substances have been dumped by different generators over
several years, synergistic effects make division of harm impossible); see also Barr,
supra note 2, at 978 (noting that where hazardous substances have commingled
over long period of time, resulting chemical reactions make divisibility virtually
impossible). But see Alcan, 964 F.2d at 270 n.29 (noting that commingling of
wastes does not necessitate finding of indivisible harm).
115. Even if defendants do not litigate, however, the settlement process will
nonetheless be impeded because defendants, realizing that the government may
not be able to hold them jointly and severally liable on summary judgment, will
be less willing to settle on the EPA's terms and will contest proposed settlement
agreements. This will slow the settlement process and delay the EPA's recovery
of response costs.
116. For a discussion of why defendants have traditionally been quick to
settle with the EPA, see supra note 18.
117. See Alcan, 964 F.2d at 270 n.29 (noting that delaying divisibility and
apportionment determinations allows EPA to compel defendants to settle to
avoid being held jointly and severally liable); see also Harris & Milan, supra note
108, at 1728 (noting that Alcan decision "takes away some of EPA's power to
threaten non-settling with joint and several liability"). The EPA can no longer
be assured that in cases where wastes have commingled at a multi-generator site,
the EPA can induce settlement by threatening to seek a summary judgment rul-
ing holding nonsettlors jointly and severally liable. See id. (stating that "EPA
can no longer be certain that no matter what the facts, all it need do to collect
from a non-settling party is to seek a summary judgment finding of joint and
several liability against that party").
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CERCLA defendants in the Third Circuit may be able to exact better
settlement agreements from the EPA.
The usefulness of the Alcan decision to defendants is unclear. De-
fendants still face a substantial burden in avoiding joint and several lia-
bility." 8 Many defendants will not be able to prove that the harm is
divisible and that the costs are capable of reasonable apportionment." 19
Additionally, many more defendants will not be able to afford an at-
tempt to prove divisibility and apportionability. 120 Moreover, after
making the required factual inquiry, district courts may still hold most
defendants jointly and severally liable.' 2 ' If this occurs, the EPA's bar-
gaining power will remain largely undisturbed and the EPA will still be
able to induce defendants to settle for a disproportionate share of the
costs.
Although it remains to be seen whether other circuits will follow the
Third Circuit and whether the district courts will address the divisibility
issue thoroughly, it appears that the Alcan decision will provide defend-
ants with at least some basis for alleviating the hardships faced by them
under CERCLA. The first indication that the Third Circuit's decision
will have an impact on future cases was provided by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Alcan Aluminum
Corp. (Alcan Second Circuit).'2 2 Subsequent to the Third Circuit's decision
in Alcan case, the Second Circuit adopted the Third Circuit's reasoning
and reversed in part the district court's decision in Alcan New York. 12 3
In Alcan Second Circuit, the court held that Alcan had created genuine
issues of material fact by submitting expert affidavits supporting its con-
tentions that its wastes did not contribute to the release and thus sum-
118. See Alcan, 964 F.2d at 269 (noting that Alcan faces substantial burden
in attempting to prove divisibility); see also Harris & Milan, supra note 108, at
1728 (noting that usefulness of Alcan decision to defendants is limited by strin-
gent standards it requires defendants to meet).
119. See Alcan, 964 F.2d at 269 (noting that divisibility analysis will require
assessment of relative toxicity, migratory potential and synergistic capacity of
wastes at site); see also Harris & Milan, supra note 108, at 1727 (noting that prov-
ing divisibility will depend on whether defendants can prove either that its
wastes were unique or were traceable to specific location at site).
120. See Harris & Milan, supra note 108, at 1728 (noting that in order to
prove divisibility and apportionability, defendants will need to incur substantial
expert and testing costs). Because of this expense, it is likely that only deep-
pocket defendants will make the divisibility/apportionability argument in an at-
tempt to avoid joint and several liability. Id.
121. See id. (noting that most district courts tend only to pay "lip service" to
the divisibility rule). Because the issue of divisibility is a factual one, even if a
district court summarily dismisses a defendant's claim of divisibility, the stan-
dard of review will be limited to "clearly erroneous," and thus, difficult to re-
verse. Id.
122. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. (Alcan Second Circuit), 990 F.2d
711 (2d Cir. 1993).
123. Id.
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mary judgment had been improperly granted for the government.12 4
The Second Circuit specifically rejected the government's argument that
commingling of wastes is synonymous with indivisibility of harm and
stated that Alcan must be given the opportunity to present evidence as
to divisibility. 12 5 Thus, the Second Circuit's ruling, as does the Third
Circuit's ruling in Alcan, brings a narrow causation defense into
CERCLA. 12 6
Alcan Second Circuit, however, differs from Alcan in two respects.
First, the Second Circuit's ruling does not require a district court to de-
termine divisibility and apportionability at the initial liability phase.' 27
Rather, the Second Circuit gave district courts discretion to determine
divisibility and apportionability at either the initial liability phase or in a
subsequent proceeding. 12 8 Second, in Alcan Second Circuit, Alcan
presented expert affidavits to support its contention that the harm was
divisible, whereas in Alcan, Alcan presented no evidence of
124. Id. at 723. Alcan argued that the response actions at the site were
attributable to chemicals that were not found in any of its wastes. Id. at 722.
The government's contentions, also supported by expert affidavits, conflicted
with Alcan's contentions. Id. Thus, genuine issues of material fact sufficient to
preclude summary judgment existed with respect to divisibility. Id. at 722-23.
125. Id. at 722. The Second Circuit stated that evidence of relative toxicity,
migratory potential, degree of migration and synergistic capacities of the wastes
at the site were all relevant evidence Alcan could present in order to establish
divisibility. Id.
126. See id. (noting that court is bringing causation back into CERCLA
case). Because CERCLA is a strict liability scheme, the government may appor-
tion liability initially without regard to fault at multi-generator sites containing
commingled wastes once the government proves a prima facie case of liability.
See id. at 721 (noting that liability under CERCLA is strict and that once govern-
ment proves prima facie case, government need not "show that a specific de-
fendant's waste caused incurrence of response costs"). The Second Circuit
stressed, however, that the burden is on the defendant to escape joint and sev-
eral liability. Id. at 722. The court also noted a defendant will only be able to
escape joint and several liability when it can prove that its wastes did not con-
tribute more than background contamination and that its pollutants cannot con-
centrate. Id. Moreover, this defense is only available to a defendant who has
not exceeded any EPA thresholds in its wastes. Id. The Second Circuit's ruling,
however, does allow a special exception to the usual absence of causation re-
quirement under CERCLA. Id.
127. Id. at 723. The Second Circuit noted that it preferred the approach of
the Third Circuit, whereby divisibility is determined at the initial liability phase.
Id.; see Alcan, 964 F.2d at 270 n.29 (noting that divisibility inquiry is "best re-
solved at the initial liability phase"). The Second Circuit noted, however, that
this approach may not be in accord with the underlying policy of CERCLA to
expedite clean-ups and recover remediation costs as quickly as possible. Alcan
Second Circuit, 990 F.2d at 723. The Second Circuit determined that the legisla-
tive history of CERCLA mandates that liability be fixed immediately for enforce-
ment purposes and that litigation may later be commenced to determine
divisibility and apportionability. Id.
128. See Alcan Second Circuit, 990 F.2d at 723 ("The choice as to when to
address divisibility and apportionment are questions best left to the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court in the handling of an individual case.").
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divisibility. ' 29
Thus, although courts appear to be headed towards a more industry
orientated interpretation of CERCLA, it remains to be seen whether
courts will follow the Third Circuit's approach in Alcan, the Second Cir-
cuit's approach in Alcan Second Circuit or the approach of the courts prior
to Alcan.
David A. Aikens
129. Id. at 722-23. InAlcan, the Third Circuit held the district court errone-
ously granted the government's summary judgment motion and that Alcan must
be given the opportunity to present any evidence of divisibility. Alcan, 964 F.2d
at 271. In Alcan, however, Alcan merely made vague contentions, unsupported
by affidavits, that its wastes could not have contributed to the harm at the site.
Id. at 269-70. Alcan therefore created no genuine issue of material fact with
respect to divisibility in Alcan and thus the Third Circuit should not have re-
versed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the govern-
ment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (holding that
summary judgment is appropriately granted against nonmoving party who failed
to produce evidence supporting essential element to its case on which nonmov-
ing party bore burden of proof at trial). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's
rationale in reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment, see supra
notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
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